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Abstract—The digitisation of industry provides a
plethora of novel applications that increase flexibility
and reduce setup and maintenance time as well as cost.
Furthermore, novel use cases are created by the digiti-
sation of industry, commonly known as Industry 4.0 or
the Industrial Internet of Things, applications make use
of communication and computation technology that is
becoming available. This enables novel business use cases,
such as the digital twin, customer individual production,
and data market places. However, the inter-connectivity
such use cases rely on also significantly increases the attack
surface of industrial enterprises. Sabotage and espionage
are aimed at data, which is becoming the most crucial
asset of an enterprise. Since the requirements on security
solutions in industrial networks are inherently different
from office networks, novel approaches for intrusion
detection need to be developed. In this work, process
data of a real water treatment process that contains
attacks is analysed. Analysis is performed by an extension
of Matrix Profiles, a motif discovery algorithm for time
series. By extending Matrix Profiles with a Hamming-
distance metric, binary and tertiary actuators can be
integrated into the analysis in a meaningful fashion. This
algorithm requires low training effort while providing
accurate results. Furthermore, it can be employed in a
real-time fashion. Selected actuators in the data set are
analysed to highlight the applicability of the extended
Matrix Profiles.
Index Terms—Intrusion Detection, Industrial Networks,
Time Series Analysis, Anomaly Detection, Data Mining
I. INTRODUCTION
The introduction of Industry 4.0, also referred to
as the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), enables an
abundance of novel use cases [1], [2]. These use cases
in turn introduce new business cases, meaning indus-
trial value generation is changed. Customer-individual
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processing with minimal delay and digital twins are
examples of the scenarios that can be implemented
because of digitisation in industry. However, since these
novel use cases rely heavily on intercommunication
and computation, the network structures of industrial
enterprises, the Operation Technology (OT) networks,
are changing. When Supervisory Control And Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems were first introduced in
the 1970’s, they were meant to control industrial devices
in a pre-defined, non-flexible fashion. Furthermore, the
networks were physically separated from public net-
works and highly application specific [3]. These features
limited the surface for an attacker. Commercial Off
The Shelf (COTS) products for industrial application
and a focus on interconnectivity drastically increase the
attack surface, making a focus on intrusion detection
necessary [4]. Since the requirements for industrial
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are different than
requirements for office Information Technology (IT)
environments, novel approaches have to be developed.
Powers et al. [5] as well as Iturbe et al. [6] dis-
cuss the different operational conditions of IT and
OT environments. Generally, OT networks are operated
for longer periods, i.e. decades, constantly with little
possibility to update or change systems. IDSs must not
affect the process, since availability is the highest rated
requirement.
The contribution of this work consists of:
• Integration of the Hamming-distance [7] into the
Matrix Profile-algorithm [8], and
• detection of attacks in a real process environment
by analysing actuator information.
The remainder of this work is structured as follows.
Section II presents related work to industrial intrusion
detection. The data set used to evaluate the useful-
ness of the extended Matrix Profiles is discussed in
Section III, the standard and extended Matrix Profiles
are introduced in Section IV. Section V evaluates the
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performance. A discussion of the algorithms and results
is presented in Section VI. This work is concluded in
Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
This section presents scientific works related to intru-
sion detection in industrial environments, with a focus
on process data analysis. As discussed in Section I, the
relevance of this topic increases. Hence, it is widely
addressed in research. Schneider and Bo¨ttinger use
autoencoders for detecting human-based attacks on an
industrial environment [9], provided by the iTrust, Cen-
tre for Research in Cyber Security, Singapore University
of Technology and Design [10]. The autoencoders are
capable of detecting the attacks in the data set called
SUTD Security Showdown (S3) 2017 (S317) in an
unsupervised fashion. Another data set provided by
this institute is analysed by Goh et al. [11]. Recurrent
Neural Networks (RNNs) are employed to detect the
attacks introduced into the industrial environment. The
same data set is evaluated in this work. Furthermore,
this data set has been analysed by means of Matrix
Profiles already, with a focus on the sensor data [12],
[13]. A counter has been introduced that was capa-
ble of not only detecting outliers, but also detecting
similar attacks that occur rarely in comparison to mo-
tifs occurring often [14]. Generally, the Secure Water
Treatment (SWaT) data set has been widely regarded
in research. Inoue et al. analyse it with Deep Neural
Networks (DNNs) as well as ocsvm [15]. Similarly,
Kravchik and Shabtai employ Convolutional Neural
Networks (CNNs) [16]. Li et al. analyse the data set
with Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [17],
[18]. A method with code mutation is presented by
Chen et al. [19]. Lin et al. develop a graphical model
to detect the attacks [20]. Long Short-Term Memory
(LSTM), a type of neural network, is applied in a
multi-level approach to detect attacks in a gas pipeline
data set by Feng et al. [21]. Means to increase the
security of industrial networks are discussed by Knapp
and Langill [22]. However, a significant disadvantage
of neural networks is the immense training data and
effort required to build expressive models. Yang et
al. introduce detection methods for attacks in power
system networks [23]. A publication summarising the
stages and development of SCADA security systems is
presented by Larkin et al. [24]. One task difficult to
achieve is detecting attacks that are formerly unknown
to the operators. Learning a model of the normal system
state and detecting deviations is a strength of machine
learning algorithms, such as One Class Support Vector
Machines (OCSVMs). Maglaras and Jiang present their
application to detecting novel attacks [25]. Industrial
communication protocols often do not provide means
for authentication and encryption [26]. Due to their
long operation times, they are still in use, resulting
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Figure 1. Relation of Sub-Processes
in the need for additional security measures. Gao and
Morrispresent an approach for signature-based intrusion
detection in Modbus-networks [27].
III. PRESENTING THE DATA SET
The data set analysed in this work is created by
the iTrust, Centre for Research in Cyber Security,
Singapore University of Technology and Design. It is
named SWaT [28], [29]. Creating data sets for intru-
sion detection is a crucial, yet non-trivial task [30].
It has been previously addressed by research, e.g. by
Schneider and Bo¨ttinger [9]. The SWaT data set was
captured in a water processing facility consisting of real
equipment. A process of water treatment was run for
eleven days. During the first seven days, only normal
operation occured. During the last four days, attacks
were introduced. The attacker was assumed to already
have broken the perimeter, thus directly impacting the
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs). Overall, one
of six PLCs was used to control a respective sub-
process. The sub-processes are as follows:
• P1: Raw water storage
• P2: Pre-treatment
• P3: Membrane Ultra Filtration (UF)
• P4: Dechlorination by Ultraviolet (UV) lamps
• P5: Reverse Osmosis (RO)
• P6: Disposal
The relation of the sub-processes is shown in Figure 1.
Each PLC controls a ring network, while the PLCs are
controlled by a SCADA workstation. Data is collected
by a data historian. The network structure is depicted
in Figure 2. The raw water is contained in an initial
tank and pre-processed. In a second step, filtration as
well as UV light and RO treatment are applied. Then
the water is stored in another tank, given the treatment
has resulted in sufficiently clean water. Otherwise, the
UV light and RO treatment are repeated.
During the four last days of operation, 41 different
instances of attacks are introduced into the process.
The attacks are changes in process variables with the
malicious intent to disrupt the operation. Ground truth,
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Figure 2. Schematic Overview of the Process Environment
i.e. a labelling known to be correct, is provided. Each
of the 41 attacks falls into one of four categories, as
introduced by Goh et al. [28]:
• Single Stage Single Point (SSSP): Single stage
attack on one point in the process, 26 instances
in the data set
• Single Stage Multi Point (SSMP): Single stage
attack on multiple points in the process, 4 instances
in the data set
• Multi Stage Single Point (MSSP): Multi stage at-
tack on one point in the process, 2 instances in the
data set
• Multi Stage Multi Point (MSMP): Multi stage at-
tack on multiple points in the process, 4 instances
in the data set
Some of the attacks, 18 in total, could not be observed
to have an influence on the process. 51 sensors and
actuators provided information about the process that
could be used to detect the attacks, a complete list is
provided by Goh et al. [28]. The top five sensors and
actuators with respect to most attacks aimed at them
are listed in Table I. This table includes the number of
attacks and the number of attacks that did not affect the
process. Each attack had a point in the process on which
Table I
SOURCES OF THE ATTACKS
Elem Sub-P Description Total No Ch
P-102 P1 Pump (backup) 3 0
P-101 P1 Pump 2 0
MV-101 P1 Motor valve 2 0
P-302 P3 UF feed pump 2 0
P-203 P2 Dosing pump 2 0
it was started and a target. Similar to the starting points,
the top five sensors and actuators that were targets of an
attack are listed in Table II, together with the number of
attacks and the number of attacks that did not influence
them.
Table II
DETECTABLE POINTS OF ATTACKS
Elem Sub-P Description Total No Ch
LIT-101 P1 Raw water tank level 7 3
P-101 P1 Pump 2 0
LIT-301 P3 UF feed tank level 5 3
MV-303 P3 Motorised valve 2 0
LIT-401 P4 RO feed tank level 3 1
IV. INTRUSION DETECTION IN INDUSTRIAL DATA
This section presents the algorithm used to detect
anomalies in industrial process data. A general assump-
tion is that in an industrial environment, deviation from
expected behaviour is either an attack, a user error or
malfunction and thus worth noting and inspecting. The
employed algorithm is not capable of distinguishing
different kinds of anomalies. In the first subsection,
the general algorithm as well as the application on
continuous data are explained. An extension to employ
the algorithm in a meaningful fashion on binary data as
well is introduced in the second subsection.
A. Continuous Data
The Matrix Profile algorithm has previously been
employed successfully to detect attacks in the data
set presented in Section III [12]–[14]. However, the
algorithm as presented by Yeh et al. relies on continuous
data. Matrix Profiles were presented by Yeh et al. in
2016 as an algorithm for motif discovery [8]. It worked
by analysing the sequences of length m starting at
each point tn of the time series and comparing it to
each other sequence of length m. The sequences are
analysed in a sliding window-fashion. A distance of the
sequences is calculated, for example the z-normalised
distance as described in (1).
d(x, y) =
√√√√ m∑
i=1
(xˆi − yˆi)2
xˆi =
xi − µx
σx
, yˆi =
yi − µy
σy
(1)
After applying Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient [31]
(2)
corr(x, y) =
E((x− µx)(y − µy))
σxσy
=
∑m
i=1 xiyi −mµxµy
mσxσy
,
(2)
where
µx =
∑m
i=1 xi
m
, µy =
∑m
i=1 yi
m
(3)
and
σ2x =
∑m
i=1 x
2
i
m
− µ2x, σ2y =
∑m
i=1 y
2
i
m
− µ2y. (4)
The Euclidean distance is derived as indicated in
(5) [32],
d(x, y) =
√
2m(1− corr(x, y)) (5)
the resulting distance metric is shown in (6).
d(x, y) =
√
2m
(
1−
∑m
i=1 xiyi −mµxµy
mσxσy
)
(6)
x and y are two distinct time series, µ is the respective
mean and σ the respective standard deviation. The
minimal distances are calculated and stored in a matrix
fashion, which leads to the name Matrix Profiles. If the
minimal distance is high in comparison to the minimal
distances of other sequences, the corresponding se-
quence is an outlier or anomaly in the time series, since
there is no similar sequence contained. On the other
hand, small minimal distances indicate the presence of
at least one similar sequence.
B. Binary Data
In contrast to sensors in industrial environments that
typically produce continuous values, e.g. the tempera-
ture, pressure or flow volume, actuators often return a
binary value. This value indicates the operation state of
the actuators, commonly either active or inactive. The
event space is binary, i.e. either on or off, which can be
represented by boolean values of 0 and 1. If these values
are considered as a time series and the Matrix Profiles
are computed with the distance metrics provided by the
authors, the calculation often breaks in praxis. If there
are constant values, or means of 0, divisions by zero
occur. This characteristic makes the current distance
metrics unsuited for binary data. To bridge this gap,
the Hamming distance [7] is proposed as an additional
distance metric for calculation of the Matrix Profiles.
The Hamming distance D(x, y) is defined “as the num-
ber of coordinates for which x and y are different” [7].
Applied to the task of evaluating the distance of binary
sensors, that means a sequence of length m is compared
to any other sequence in the time series of the same
length m in a sliding window fashion. The sequences
are compared, the distance is derived by calculating
the number of bits that are different between the two
sequences for a given position. This approach results in
a distance which can then be used to compute the Matrix
Profiles as introduced in the previous subsection.
V. EVALUATION
This section presents the application of the extended
Matrix Profiles as presented in Section IV to the data
set introduced in Section III. The application of Matrix
Profiles to continuous sensor data obtained from the
same data set has been successfully evaluated in related
works [12]–[14].
In this work, a total of three time intervals was
selected from the data set and evaluated for attacks.
These intervals contain selected attacks on the top four
sources for attacks, listed in Table I. The sequence
length m was set to 2 000 or 500. Those values were
used as preliminary evaluations provided promising
results for these values. In contrast to machine learning-
based intrusion detection, the Matrix Profiles algorithm
does not require a training phase and training data
as such. Instead, each sequence is compared to every
other sequence. A general assumption about batch pro-
cessing is the periodicity of behaviour, i.e. the process
variables repeat themselves over and over again. In
case of water treatment, a batch of water is introduced
to the treatment process, treated in each stage, and
removed from the environment. This process is then
repeated with the next batch of water, which creates
highly similar values in terms of process control. This
leads to the assumption that events occurring repeatedly
are intended, while events only happening once are
malicious or non-intentional. Furthermore, one period
of normal operation is sufficient to detect normal and
anomalous behaviour. In the course of this work, several
periods of normal operation were employed, since there
might be small deviations.
With this in mind, each interval analysed in this
work consists of a period without attacks, followed
by two instances of attacks. For each interval, one
or two sensors are analysed. In the first and third
interval, two actuators are evaluated. In the second
interval, one actuator was analysed. The first interval
starts with the last 10 000 events of the normal data
set, i.e. the seven day period during which no attacks
were introduced. Appended are the first 7 203 events of
the malicious data set, i.e. the four day period during
which all attacks occurred. That means 10 000 events
can be considered as training data, the next 7 203 events
contain the attacks, but they contain normal operation as
well. An overview of the interval is shown in Figure 3.
The actuator output for the motorised valve MV-101
controlling water flow to the raw water tank as well as
for the backup pump P-102 pumping water from the raw
water tank to the next stage are shown in the top line
with the dotted line indicating MV-101 and the dashed
line P-102. For some reason that is not explained by
the authors of the data set, MV-101 provides tertiary
output, i.e. zero, one, and two. In the second line, the
minimal distances are shown, again with the dotted
line indicating MV-101 and the dashed line P-102.
Attacks are indicated in the bottom line. Overall, four
attacks occur during the interval, however, the last two
attacks are affecting neither MV-101 nor P-102 and
are not expected to be discoverable by observing these
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Figure 3. Matrix Profile of Interval 1 for MV-101 and P-102
actuators. Still, the third attack aims at the raw water
tank level so that it implicitly also affects the valve
MV-101, leading to a smaller raise in minimal distance
around second 15 000. Due to the inter-dependability
of components, attacks can be detected by looking at
devices that are not target of the given attack. The first
attack unexpectedly opens the motorised valve MV-101,
leading to an uncontrolled water flow into the raw water
tank and potential overflow. This unexpected behaviour
is clearly distinguishable in Figure 3, meaning this
attack can be detected. The second attack is turning on
the backup pump P-102 increasing the pressure in the
pipe from raw water tank to initial stage of treatment.
This could lead to a pipe burst. Similar to the first
attack, this attack can be detected by the change of
minimal Hamming-distance of the Matrix Profile as the
backup pump is expected to remain inactive unless a
malfunction requires it to become active. Figure 3 shows
that the minimal distance is continuously increasing
with the start of the attack, as for each sequence after
the attack, more data points are different from known
sequences. Hence, defining a sensible threshold value
allows for early discovery of the attack. In this case,
a threshold around 0.1 would easily detect all attacks
with no false positives.
Interval 2 is the period on December 31st from
18:00:00 to 23:16:00, covering 62 160 events during
which two attacks occur. The actuator under observation
is the pump P-302 that pumps water from the UF feed
tank into the RO feed tank. As a first attack, P-302
is kept on despite of the RO feed tank having reached
capacity. As a second attack, P-302 is turned off to
stop the flow of water. This behaviour is shown in
Figure 4. Since the two attacks in this interval are
occurring back to back, there is only one attack-peak
visible. The second attack lasts for several hours, thus
the length. The first attack leads to a slight peak in the
minimal distance, as it consists of leaving the pump
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Figure 4. Matrix Profile of Interval 2 for P-302
open. Since the first attack only affects the system
briefly, its characteristic is hardly different than nor-
mal operation. The second attack, however, leads to a
notable peak in the minimal distance, clearly marking
an anomaly. Both attacks can be detected automatically,
given an appropriate threshold is selected. Additionally,
the width of the peak can be used as an indicator of
an anomaly. The window size m was set to 2000 for
analysis of this interval. A value of 500 led to constant
minimal distance of 0, presumably since a window size
smaller than a period of operation does not contain
relevant information, i.e. the length and structure of one
period.
Interval 3 is the period on January 1st from 14:30:00
to 20:00:00, covering 19 801 events during which two
attacks occur. The window size m is set to 500, as
it produces better results than window sizes of 1 000
and 2 000. This contrasts the results of other works
employing Matrix Profiles for process data evaluation
stating that the window size m should not be smaller
than the first peak of the autocorrelation function, but
might as well be larger [13]. In interval 3, the pump
P-101 transporting water from the raw water tank into
the second stage is observed. For both attacks, P-101
is turned off to stop the water flow. However, during
the first attack, backup pump P-102 is turned on so
that the effect on the water level is not visible for the
operator. This behaviour of pumps P-101 and P-102
is shown in Figure 5. The minimal distances of both
actuators peak notably during the attacks. Due to the
length of the window size and the closeness of the
attacks, the minimal distance only contains one peak,
which starts at the beginning of the first attack. The
behaviour of the water level sensor LIT-301 during that
period is shown in Figure 6. The minimal distance for
this sensor is calculated with the Scalable Time series
Anytime Matrix Profile (STAMP) algorithm [8]. Due
to the backup pump P-102, the first attack cannot be
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Figure 5. Matrix Profile of Interval 3 for P-101 and P-102
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detected by analysing the water level, as there is no
effect on the process, except for an anomalous pump
use. In this case, evaluating actuators can detect attacks
that could not be detected otherwise.
VI. DISCUSSION
The evaluation of the actuators provides an accurate
detection of attacks on the process. In case of interval 3,
the analysis of actuator behaviour is capable of detect-
ing attacks that do not influence the system because of
a backup pump P-102. Knowledge about an attempted
attack that has failed is valuable for threat intelligence
as it indicates the presence of an attacker. Due to
the uniform behaviour of actuators, attacks are clearly
distinguishable from normal operation by looking at the
distance metrics. It is typical for processes in batch pro-
cessing to repeat for a large amount of time, providing
a sound normal behaviour that is used as the basis for
intrusion detection. An advantage of Matrix Profiles
is the unsupervised fashion to deploy it. In contrast
to many machine learning-based approaches, neither
training nor labelled data are necessary to create sound
models. Furthermore, it requires one hyper-parameter
that is relatively robust. Still, choosing a window size m
is the most difficult task in employing Matrix Profiles
Values that are too small lead to an increase in false
negatives, while window sizes that are too large lead to
false positives. Similar to previous works, window sizes
around the period length seem to be an optimal choice.
VII. CONCLUSION
This work showed that the extended Matrix Profiles
employing the Hamming-distance are capable of detect-
ing all evaluated attacks without any false positives.
Furthermore, training was performed automatically. For
future work, extending the algorithm to extract motifs
could prove beneficial in terms of computation time.
Since many sequences are expected to be identical, a
dictionary with a motif and its number of occurrences
reduces the amount of comparisons required, while pro-
viding the same amount of information. Furthermore,
the number of occurrences can be used as an additional
metric for an outlier, as this would detect an attack
that was deployed twice. The second time would not
be detected by regular Matrix Profiles as the exact
same motif was already present. However, any motif
with a comparably low number of occurrences could
be considered suspicious, similar to the work of Duque
Anton et al. [14].
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